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MARC – Mergers & Acquisitions Research Centre 
MARC is the Mergers and Acquisitions Research Centre at Cass Business School, City, 
University of London – the first research centre at a major business school to pursue focussed 
leading-edge research into the global mergers and acquisitions industry. 
MARC blends the expertise of M&A accountants, bankers, lawyers, consultants and other key 
market participants with the academic excellence of Cass to provide fresh insights into the 
world of deal-making. 
Corporations, regulators, professional services firms, exchanges and universities use MARC 
for swift access to research and practical ideas. From deal origination to closing, from financing 
to integration, from the hottest emerging markets to the board rooms of the biggest 
corporations, MARC researches the wide spectrum of mergers, acquisitions and corporate 
restructurings. 
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Overview
hether a conglomerate is an 
efficient model for a business has 
been a question for the markets for 
many years. And it’s not just a question of 
conglomerates being potentially undervalued 
because they have units whose value is not 
recognised in the share price. It’s also about 
whether they are actually run more 
inefficiently than pure-play entities. 
The question of whether a conglomerate is an 
efficient organisational structure for the 
purpose of efficient allocation of scarce 
capital has engaged scholars since the 
1980s, triggered by the increasing trend 
among diversified firms to sell-off many of 
their component businesses. 
Many corporate finance scholars have 
argued that the internal capital markets  
operated by diversified firms allocate capital 
inefficiently, deviating from the principle of 
investing in the most efficient segments of 
their businesses. 
So, what are a conglomerate’s CEO’s 
options? 
- Spin-off: Distribute shares in a 
subsidiary to your own shareholders 
- Sell-off: Sell a subsidiary (either full IPO 
or trade sale) 
- Carve-out: IPO a minority stake in a 
subsidiary 
Of the three options, the first two give up 
influence on the spun-off business. You are 
effectively telling the market that either you 
cannot allocate capital efficiently or that you 
do not think the market will give you credit for 
the value while you still have influence, 
assuming, of course, that the reason for the 
sale is not just a simple change in corporate 
strategy leading to the sale of a non-core 
business. But through these options you and 
your shareholders will get the greatest 
freedom in terms of the ability to redeploy 
capital.  
We also know that the carve-out is rarely a 
permanent solution. Only 8% of carve-outs 
continue to exist as parent-controlled public 
companies after five years, that is, where the 
parent owns more than 50% of shares. 
Nearly 40% are ultimately acquired by third 
parties, and an additional 31% see the parent 
stake reduced to less than 25%. 
So, for carve-outs we need to consider:  
1. Will it improve your capital efficiency? 
2. What is it that will make the difference? 
3. Where will it lead eventually? 
 
This report answers these three questions 
and comes up with the following answers: 
1. Unlike spin-offs or sell offs, carve-outs 
improve investment efficiency 
2. Internal (board structure, etc.) and 
external (outside monitoring and 
analysis) changes in governance drive 
the difference 
3. Should it go well, you may well end up 
buying the floated stake back (this is not 
a tautological statement: we are not 
talking about just identifying hidden 
value, but rather how the carve-out itself 
can improve profitability in ways not 
possible within the existing corporate 
structure). 
 
So, should you perceive issues around 
capital allocation in your business, do 
consider the carve-out option even though it 
will mean real change and more external 
pressures. But be aware you may well be 
employing your spun-off colleagues again in 
the very near future! 
And, numerous studies have shown, carve-
outs are often well received by the market, 
providing a significant share price return upon 
announcement of between 1-2%. 
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What we knew (or thought we knew)
he growth of the conglomerate structure, 
although now seemingly out of favour, 
did have a sound theoretical basis. The 
conglomerate head office functions as a capital 
market, playing the allocating role through the 
internal capital market (ICM). Such a market 
could be seen to have information advantage 
over investors in the conventional external 
capital market in being able to assess the 
strategic and value creation potential of the 
different portfolio businesses using internally 
generated information that is not accessible to 
external investors. Moreover, this information 
advantage allows the conglomerate to pick 
potential winners and allocate capital to the 
highest valued investment opportunities, 
thereby maximising the returns to the 
conglomerate’s shareholders. 
This benign view of the efficiency of the ICM 
was challenged by several scholars who 
identified a range of impediments to the 
putative efficiency of the ICM. 
Conglomerate reorganisation 
The trend towards conglomerate reorganisation 
was attributed to the realisation of the failure of 
the capital allocation function of the 
conglomerate firms which undermined the 
financial rationale for the structure. Berger and 
Ofek 1  provided empirical evidence that the 
stock market valuation of conglomerate firms in 
the US was significantly less than the sum of 
the values that could be assigned to the 
component businesses of those 
conglomerates. Their methodology involved 
estimating the value of each component 
business by comparison with the valuation of an 
independent, stand-alone single-segment firm 
with valuation based on the assumption that 
such a pure-play was a reliable proxy for the 
conglomerate’s component segment. 
Several explanations have been offered for this 
undervaluation phenomenon2. Among them is 
that conglomerates have failed in their ICM role 
                                                          
1 Berger, P.G. and Ofek, E, Journal of Financial Economics, 1995 
2  Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J. Perspectives on Positive Political 
Economy, 1990 
and do not always allocate capital to the highest 
valued portfolio businesses. Complexity of the 
conglomerate business portfolio, complexity of 
the administrative structure, internal politics of 
the capital allocation process, agency conflicts 
between the top managers and divisional 
managers and between the top management 
and the shareholders are some of the factors 
that have been examined as sources of 
dysfunctionality of the ICM3. A corollary to this 
argument is that any restructuring of the 
conglomerate portfolio which results in greater 
focus should improve the efficiency of the ICM. 
One should therefore observe a significant 
improvement in the investment efficiency of the 
parent following such re-focusing.  
Many other studies have empirically tested for 
the inefficiency of pre-restructuring parent ICM 
using data from the post-restructuring parent 
and its offspring such as the spun-off business 
(see, for example, Ahn and Denis, 2004 4 ). 
These reported significant improvement in 
investment efficiency of parent firms.  
Questioning the improvements 
However, Colak and Whited5 (hereafter, ‘C&W’) 
more recently examined whether spin-offs and 
sell-offs really lead to improvements in the 
functioning of the internal capital markets of 
conglomerates. The authors posit that the 
decisions to restructure and to improve the ICM 
are decisions linked to the efficiency of the 
corporate prior to the event and that any 
assessment of the impact of restructuring on 
ICM efficiency should address the self-selection 
bias. With this methodological refinement, C&W 
reported no improvement in the ICM following 
spin-offs and sell-offs when compared to a 
matched control sample. However, they did not 
address carve-outs…  
3 Scharfstein, D.S. and Stein, J.C. Journal of Finance, 2000 
4 Ahn, S. and Denis, D.J. Journal of Financial Economics, 2004 
5 Colak, G. and Whited, T.M. The Review of Financial Studies, 2007 
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The link to M&A 
Carve-outs enable the parent to establish the 
offspring’s value in a more transparent manner, 
namely, by reducing the information gap that 
may exist between company insiders and the 
capital market participants (i.e., the company 
outsiders). In other words, the equity carve-out 
makes it possible for investors to gain a better 
understanding of the operations of the carved-
out subsidiary6. One reason for the increased 
transparency is the fact that the carve-out is 
associated with the release of information about 
the offspring through the filing of different 
regulatory forms such as registration 
statements, 10-Ks, proxy statements and 
annual reports.  
The best of both worlds? 
At the same time the carved-out entity can still 
enjoy most of the synergistic benefits arising 
from joint operation with the parent company. 
Thus, the parent can unlock hidden value and 
at the same time reap the potential benefits of 
preserving the ICM, thereby increasing the 
combined value of the parent. The hidden value 
is expected to be more transparently reflected 
in the stock price of the offspring because of the 
likely boost in the number of analysts following 
it and the enhanced quality of the information 
that is disseminated about the business 
segment as well as the parent. In addition, the 
carve-out allows the different business 
segments of the parent to be valued by analysts 
who have developed expertise in their 
respective industries, consistent with the 
evidence that both the number and the 
specialisation of analysts are improved 
following carve-outs. 
Governance improvements 
Moreover, carve-out as a mechanism for 
restructuring a given diversified business has 
management incentive-related advantages 7 . 
Post-carve out, the offspring management can 
be rewarded in its own stock, thereby 
                                                          
6 Desai, C.A., Klock, M.S. and Mansi, S.A. Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 2011 
7 Holstrom, B. and Tirole, J. The Journal of Political Economy, 1993 
enhancing management-stockholder 
alignment. In addition, there is some evidence 
that the adoption of segment-based incentive 
plans could exert a positive influence on the 
quality of employees that either the offspring or 
the parent can hire8. Such incentive alignment 
enhances both the offspring’s and parent’s 
valuation. 
With the separate listing of the offspring, which 
nevertheless remains within the majority 
ownership and control of the parent, the 
financing and investment cash flows between 
the two entities are more transparent and more 
rigorously monitored by analysts and investors. 
This enhances the quality of investment 
decision processes within the diversified parent 
and allows the parent to focus on its core 
business, thereby boosting the efficiency of its 
ICM. This opportunity for enhanced 
transparency and monitoring of the ICM, while 
essentially preserving its scope, differentiates a 
carve-out from a spin-off or a sell-off. 
Both parent and offspring can benefit 
Moreover, since the restructuring is motivated 
by the need to improve the allocative efficiency 
of the ICM, and poor corporate governance is a 
possible source of such inefficiency, 
governance structures of the parent and the 
offspring are expected to change as a result of 
the carve-out. Such structural changes are both 
internal and external to the firms and include 
changes to the board (its size and 
independence) and level of analyst following. 
In addition, because of the potential decrease 
in information asymmetry and improved 
management incentive plans following carve-
outs, we expect that the quality of corporate 
governance of both parent and offspring would 
improve following the restructuring event. The 
augmented corporate governance 
characteristics of the parent company are likely 
to drive the observed improvement in the 
efficiency of the ICM. 
8  Kumar, R. and Sopariwala, P.R. The Journal of Finance and 
Quantitative Analysis, 1992 
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Our findings 
irst, we look at whether investment 
efficiency is improved by carve out. The 
results shown in Figure 2 below provide 
consistent evidence that carve-outs can 
increase the level of investment efficiency of the 
ICM in conglomerate firms. This supports our a 
priori expectation that carve-outs present an 
effective mechanism by exposing the given 
carved-out segment to greater stock market 
scrutiny, imposing greater transparency on the 
functioning of parent’s own ICM and improving 
the quality of corporate governance of the 
parent and offspring. The fact that parents are 
better able to allocate capital across different 
business segments following carve-outs also 
suggests that the pre-restructuring parent was 
suffering from inefficiency of the ICM. 
What is driving the improvement? 
If we just consider what changes do take place 
in a carve-out, then we find that the analyst 
coverage of both parent and offspring firms 
increases significantly following the carve-out. 
We also find that carve-outs lead to 
improvements in some internal governance 
characteristics of parent firms such as greater 
board independence, smaller board size and 
CEO compensation based on stronger stock-
based incentives. Our findings then indicate 
that the observed improvements in investment 
efficiency of parent firms are driven by the 
positive changes in the internal and external 
governance characteristics in these firms. 
Figure 3 shows the results from the analysis. 
We note that there was insufficient information 
for some of the companies in the matched 
control sample. As a result, we could not 
include all measures of internal and external 
corporate governance quality in our regression 
model (Specifically, we had to exclude the 
following variables: ‘Change in Shares of 
Institutional Investors’, ‘Change in CEO 
Tenure’, and ‘Change in Analyst Forecast 
Error’). Overall, the results presented in the 
                                                          
9 Cai, J. and Vijh, A.M. The Journal of Finance, 2007 
figure confirm the robustness of our findings 
and show that the improvements in corporate 
governance characteristics are significantly 
related to the change in investment efficiency 
and valuation following carve-outs. Specifically, 
our analysis shows that greater board 
independence, lower board size, separation of 
the roles of CEO and chairman as well as 
higher non-cash CEO compensation are all 
significantly related to the change in relative 
value added. In addition, greater analyst 
coverage and higher non-cash CEO 
compensation are significantly related to 
changes in excess value. 
What is the end-game? 
Finally, inspired by the literature which shows 
that carve-outs tend to be a temporary 
organisational form, we examined the change 
in allocational efficiency and valuation of the 
parent company within the five sub-groups 
described in the appendix section. Our analysis 
(Figure 4 below) shows that in the sub-group of 
carve-outs which are followed by re-acquisition 
of full control of the subsidiary, the parent firms 
tend to experience the most significant 
improvements in investment efficiency and 
valuation (in terms of consistency of positive 
outcome, regardless of the measure used). 
Note the corporate action may take place 
beyond the analytical measurement horizon 
used here. These results are consistent with the 
analysis in Cai and Vijh 9  who show that 
companies with higher valuation are more likely 
to become acquirers. We interpret these 
findings as evidence that the observed positive 
changes in the parent firm following the initial 
carve-out event present the parent with a 
stronger capability to buy back the offspring 
since they make it easier for the parent to obtain 
financing for the acquisition either in the form of 
equity or debt. 
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Figure 2: Change in investment efficiency and firm value post carve-out 
Event Relative Investment Ratio Relative Value Added Excess Value 
 2 yrs 3 yrs 2 yrs 3 yrs 2 yrs 3 yrs 
Carve-
out 
Positive 
moderate 
Positive very 
weak 
Positive 
strong 
Positive 
moderate 
Positive 
moderate 
Negative very 
weak 
Source Cass Business School 
 
 
Figure 3:  Difference-in-difference analysis of the effect of changes in corporate governance characteristics following carve-out 
on investment efficiency and valuation of the parent. 
 
 
 Change in Relative 
Investment Ratio 
Change in 
Relative Value 
Added 
 Change in Excess 
Value 
Change in Analyst Coverage Positive very weak Positive very weak Positive strong 
Change in Board Indep. Negative very weak Positive strong Negative very weak 
Change in Board Size Positive very weak Negative strong Positive very weak 
Chairman/CEO identical Positive very weak Negative strong Negative strong 
CEO Comp. (Non-cash) Negative very weak Positive strong Positive strong 
CEO Comp. (Cash) Negative very weak Positive very weak Positive strong 
    
Observations 93 93 93 
Source: Cass Business School 
 
Figure 4: Change in investment efficiency and firm value per final outcome Sub-sample following the carve-out 
Events Relative Investment Ratio Relative Value Added Excess Value 
 2 yrs 3 yrs 2 yrs 3 yrs 2 yrs 3 yrs 
Spin-off (A) 
Positive 
very weak 
Positive 
weak 
Positive very 
weak 
Positive 
moderate 
Negative very 
weak 
Negative 
moderate 
Sell-off (B) 
Positive 
very weak 
Positive 
very weak 
Positive 
moderate 
Positive 
moderate 
Negative very 
weak 
Negative very 
weak 
Re-
acquisition 
(C) 
Positive 
weak 
Positive 
moderate 
Positive 
strong 
Positive 
strong 
Positive 
moderate 
Positive 
moderate 
SEO (D) 
Positive 
moderate 
Positive 
very weak 
Positive 
weak 
Positive 
very weak 
Positive 
strong 
Positive 
very weak 
Retention 
(E) 
Positive 
strong 
Positive 
moderate 
Positive 
moderate 
Positive 
strong 
Positive 
very weak 
Positive 
very weak 
Source: Cass Business School 
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The carve-out 
A carve-out is the initial sale by a corporation of 
common stock in one of its business units. The 
initial public offering generally involves less 
than the entire amount of the stock in the unit 
so the parent company retains an equity stake 
in the subsidiary, and indeed often involves 
retention of a controlling stake.  
Case Study Phillip Morris's 2001 equity carve-
out of a portion of its ownership in subsidiary 
Kraft Foods resulted in what at that time was 
the second largest initial public offering in U.S. 
history at $8.7 billion. 
 
Demand for the Kraft issue was strong enough 
to allow the managers, Credit Suisse First 
Boston and Salomon Smith Barney, to increase 
the issue price to $31 per share from an earlier 
estimate of $27 to $30. Kraft, owner of well-
known products including Maxwell House 
coffee, Post cereals, and Planters peanuts, was 
wholly owned by Phillip Morris prior to the IPO. 
Subsequent to the carve-out, Phillip Morris held 
slightly less than 50% of Kraft's class A 
common stock but controlled nearly all of the 
firm's voting shares. Proceeds from the stock 
issue were to be used to reduce Kraft's 
immense debt, which was incurred when the 
company in late 2000 purchased Nabisco 
Holdings for nearly $20 billion. 
Below we show a sample of other carve-outs: 
Figure 1: Sample equity carve-outs in the US and Europe 
Year Parent (country) Subsidiary carved 
out 
% of Equity in IPO IPO raises ($m) 
2015 Credit Agricole 
(France) 
Amundi 20 1,600 
2015 Bayer AG 
(Germany 
Covestro 31 1,600 
2006 Halliburton (US KBR 17 473 
2006 Agilent 
Technologies (US) 
Verigy 15 128 
2005 Thyssen-
Bormemisza (NL) 
HIS, Inc 25 232 
2005 AMD and Fujitsu 
(US & Japan) 
Spansion Inc 33 470 
2004 Titan International 
(US) 
Titan Europe 60 40 
2000 Siemens AG 
(Germany) 
Infineon 
Technologies 
29 11,709 
2000 ZFS (Switzerland) PSP Swiss 
Property 
52 278 
1999 Bayer AG 
(Germany) 
Agfa-Gevaert 50 1,782 
Source: Cass Business School 
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Conclusions and implications 
y accounting for the problem of self-
selection bias we demonstrate that the 
improvement of the internal capital 
market is a result of the refocusing activity itself. 
In particular, our results show that investment 
efficiency is significantly enhanced following 
carve-outs and that these results are not driven 
by any inherent characteristics associated with 
companies which choose to perform a carve-
out but by the carve-out itself. 
Real change, not just valuation 
transparency 
Importantly, we also demonstrate that the 
improvement in investment efficiency of parent 
firms is linked to increased capital market 
scrutiny and board independence as well as 
reduced board size in these companies 
following carve-outs. Our analysis shows that 
the enhanced allocative efficiency is further 
related to the fact that CEOs of the parent firms 
have stronger incentives to act in the best 
interest of shareholders since their 
compensation contracts are geared more 
towards non-cash and equity-based 
compensation following carve-outs. 
Next steps post carve-out 
Our findings on follow-up events and re-
acquisition are probably not surprising since 
highly-valued companies are likely to be able to 
obtain financing for the re-acquisition of the 
carved-out subsidiary relatively more easily 
than their lower valued competitors. This 
augmented access to financing is twofold. First, 
the parent has the opportunity to use its highly 
valued stock as a currency in the re-acquisition. 
Second, the parent also has an enhanced 
ability to obtain debt financing from the capital 
markets given the improvement in the value of 
its shares. In contrast, in the cases where the 
initial carve-out event results in a significant 
deterioration in the valuation of the parent 
(which tends to be the case for carve-outs 
followed by a spin-off) or does not result in any 
significant shifts in the valuation of the parent 
(the likely outcome for carve-outs followed by a 
sell-off), we are in situations where the 
company is effecting a ‘clean break’ from the 
offspring and either divesting or spinning-off the 
subsidiary.  
As well as analysis to answer our three 
questions, a number of other variables were 
tested in a full multiple regression analysis, 
without providing outcomes that influenced our 
conclusions. For more details on our sample 
and sources please see the appendix to this 
report. 
Figure 5 below summarises the corporate 
development from the recognition of a 
conglomerate problem to the impact the 
success or not of changes made will have on 
the next steps. 
We believe our analysis carries important 
implications for the corporate managers who 
seek to improve the investment efficiency of 
their companies by demonstrating that carve-
outs could be a more effective mechanism to 
restructure company operations when 
compared to spin-offs and sell-offs.  
 
 
 
.
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Figure 5: Conglomerate – carve-out – next event process 
 
= Direct actions 
= Secondary effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Cass Business School 
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Appendix: 
Sample/Methodology: 
We obtained the sample of carve-outs from the 
SDC Global New Issues Database. Our final 
sample of carve-outs consists of 354 completed 
transactions. In line with the sample selection 
criteria used in C&W, we obtain our sample of 
control companies from the most recent 
Compustat business information file. We 
exclude the firm-year observations which lack 
any of the financial information necessary to 
perform the different matching procedures. We 
also remove from the control group companies 
with a changing number of segments during the 
 
sample period. Finally, we require that each 
control observation has more than one 
business segment. The time period for both 
samples of conglomerate companies covers 
the period 1980-2013.  
We exclude parent companies for which 
company- and segment-level data are not 
available. Following the sample construction 
methodology in C&W we exclude companies 
which operate in financial services industries 
with Standard Industry Classification (SIC) 
codes between 6000 and 6999. 
  
Our Approach:
s well as our analysis directly tackling 
the issue of carve-out success, it is also 
a methodology that lends itself to 
judging conglomerate efficiency in a way that 
analysis of spin-offs and disposals will not. 
Carve-out analysis may be more 
insightful 
In contrast to a spin-off or sell-off that truncates 
the ICM of the parent, a carve-out preserves its 
size and complexity because the carved-out 
segment does not leave the control and 
ownership of the parent. In using the post spin-
off or sell-off data to assess whether the pre-
restructuring parent’s ICM was inefficient, as 
done in previous studies including C&W, it has 
to be assumed that the relationship between 
the spun-off or sold-off business and the rest of 
the parent’s business portfolio is not relevant. 
We need to make assumptions as to whether 
this relationship had a positive or negative 
effect on the other businesses and hence on the 
portfolio performance. Such assumptions are 
redundant when one considers carve-outs 
since the carved-out segments continue to be 
part of the parental portfolio. Whatever relations 
had existed between them and the remaining 
segments would be unimpaired by the carving 
out.  
Given this continuity, assessment of the 
parent’s pre-carve-out investment efficiency 
using the post-carve-out investment efficiency 
is a methodologically superior approach since it 
dispenses with the need to make assumptions 
concerning the relationship between the 
carved-out segment and the residual segments.  
For the above reasons, we believe that any 
assessment of the pre-restructuring efficiency 
of the parent’s ICM is likely to be less 
ambiguous as to its source and more robust 
when based on a carve-out sample than when 
based on either a spin-off or sell-off sample. 
Despite these advantages of basing the 
analysis on carve-outs, they have not been 
examined in previous studies. 
The self-selection issue 
In this study, we examine a sample of US firms 
that embark on carve-outs. We compare the 
investment efficiency of the parent firms post- 
and pre-restructuring and assess the statistical 
significance of any improvement.  
We adopt the methodology in C&W and control 
for the potential self-selection bias of the carve-
out decision by evaluating the change in the 
allocative efficiency of the internal capital 
A 
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market relative to the change in such efficiency 
which occurs in a group of control companies 
with similar characteristics. Specifically, we 
account for the degree of diversification, size, 
liquidity, leverage, industry control and IPO 
activity as well as industry growth.  
How we measure internal efficiency 
We employ three different metrics that are 
expected to reflect the efficiency of the ICM. 
Two are direct measures of capital allocation 
based on the relative value creation potential of 
segments: relative investment ratio (RINV) and 
relative value added (RVA). Another is an 
indirect measure, i.e., it reflects the change in 
the parent company valuation (Excess Value). 
We will use the term ‘investment efficiency’ 
interchangeably for the three metrics. 
We use correlation-based measures of 
investment efficiency, namely as mentioned 
above, RINV, RVA and Excess Value. 
Correlation-based measures of investment 
efficiency capture the association between the 
level of investment and the investment 
opportunities across segments. The parent’s 
investment is considered to become more 
efficient the stronger the association between 
investment and investment opportunities at the 
segment level. 
RINV will be higher when companies invest 
more in their higher rated market price/book 
segments (defined by the ratings of pure-play 
equivalents), i.e., when they are more efficient. 
RVA can be thought of as the sales-weighted 
variability between investment and the market 
price to book ratio. Higher values of RVA 
indicate higher levels of investment efficiency. 
We also include measures of the change in 
company valuation following each of the three 
types of restructuring, namely the change in the 
Excess Value of the conglomerate. This 
variable captures the value of a conglomerate 
relative to a collection of single-segment 
companies in the industries corresponding to 
the conglomerate’s segments. 
We calculate the average values of RINV, RVA 
and Excess Value before and after carve-outs. 
The 3 questions we pose: 
1) Will it improve your capital 
efficiency? 
To investigate the impact of carve-outs on 
investment efficiency and firm valuation we 
construct two different samples of companies 
based on US data: a sample of companies 
which carve-out divisions and a sample that 
does not perform any refocusing activities over 
the whole sample period.  
We account for the degree of diversification, 
size, liquidity, leverage, industry control and 
IPO activity as well as industry growth.  
2) What caused any change? 
To examine whether enhanced corporate 
governance of the parent and offspring post- 
carve outs is associated with greater allocative 
efficiency, we match the offspring and its parent 
firm with the BoardEx database. Corporate 
internal governance characteristics are 
measured by board duality (CEO/Chairman 
overlap), board size, board composition, CEO 
compensation structure and tenure. External 
governance characteristics are measured by 
analyst coverage and the presence of 
institutional investors on the share register of 
the given company.  
In order to examine the robustness of the 
results presented in this section we perform 
additional regression analysis of the 
relationship between the change in investment 
efficiency and the change in corporate 
governance characteristics of the parent firm. 
This determines whether the improvement in 
investment efficiency that is higher than any 
improvement in the matched control sample is 
driven by increases in the internal and external 
corporate governance quality of the parent 
sample that are higher than any potential 
increases that may have materialised in the 
matched control sample over the same time 
period. The difference in difference values are 
calculated as the change in the parent company 
minus the change in the matched control firm 
over the same time period.  
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3) What is the likely final outcome? 
Prior research shows that carve-outs appear to 
be a transitory organisational form that is 
eventually followed by another corporate event 
such as a spin-off, sell-off or reacquisition. We 
find that approximately 80% of the carve-outs in 
our sample are followed by either a spin-off, a 
sell-off, a reacquisition or a secondary equity 
offering of the carved out business. These take 
place within an average period of three years 
after the year of the carve-out. 
Figure 6: Events after carve-out 
Events Number of events 
Spin-off 30 
Sell-off 82 
Re-acquisition 108 
SEO 62 
Retention 72 
Total 354 
Source: Cass Business School 
To test whether there is an association between 
the type of corporate event that follows a given 
carve-out and the change in allocational 
efficiency we repeat the analysis above based 
on the following sub-samples: 
Sub-sample A – Carve-outs followed by spin-
off: the parent company distributes all the 
shares in the offspring to its shareholders 
Sub-sample B – Carve-outs followed by a sell-
off: the parent company sells the offspring to a 
third party 
Sub-sample C – Carve-outs followed by re-
acquisitions: the parent company re-acquires 
the outstanding shares of the offspring 
Sub-sample D – Carve-outs followed by 
secondary equity offering: the parent company 
sells shares of the offspring to the open market 
Sub-sample E – Carve-outs which are not 
followed by any other corporate events 
(retention). 
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